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Testing the Power Transition Theory with Relative Military
Power
Abstract
This article tests the power transition theory using relative military power within a dyad
pair. The author hypothesizes that when a dyad pair achieves relative military power parity,
the two states are likely to initiate war. Furthermore, when a dyad pair no longer maintains
relative military power parity, the probability of war between the two states decreases.
Although the sample population used to test this hypothesis is small (n=3), the mixedmethod analysis indicates support to the power transition theory. Furthermore, results are
more substantial when using military expenditure and surplus domestic when compared to
results using military personnel and surplus domestic product. No statistically significant
difference exists (p=.99) when comparing military expenditure and surplus domestic
product with a combination of military expenditure, military personnel, and surplus
domestic product. These results indicate that relative military power possesses the
potential to provide researchers an additional quantitative measure to test the power
transition theory. Although these initial results are promising, further research is required
to test a larger sample population of dyads.
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Introduction
Since the publication of World Politics, the power transition theory remains
one of the most prominent and convincing models of state interaction.1
Significant data and literature support much of the original theory proposed
by Organski over sixty years ago. However, prominent political scientists
such as Douglas Lemke, Woosang Kim, Suzanna Werner, and Jacek Kugler
improved the theory over time by making significant contributions to the
power transition theory. Contributing to the power transition theory
provides researchers a better understanding of the conditions necessary for
both war and peace.
One of the earliest tests of power transition theory measured power utilizing
gross national product (GNP).2 Other published tests of the power
transition theory included measurements from the Correlates of War
(COW) Project, gross domestic product (GDP), or, most recently, surplus
domestic product (SDP). Most measures of power support the power
transition theory, but no measure of power is without its flaws. Some power
measurements accurately identify power transitions, while other power
measurements fail to identify when some power transitions occur. Even an
accurate measure of power that identifies some power transitions does not
always identify all power transitions. Therefore, the task of accurately
measuring power remains a prominent topic of discussion amongst power
transition theorists. Combining both new and well-establishes
measurements of power, this article aims to build upon these discussions to
determine the probability of two states engaging in war using relative
military power.

Literature Review
The power of a state is a difficult concept to measure; yet, for power
transition theorists, measuring power is necessary to test the theory.
Despite the difficulty of the task, many scholars continue to discover
various, and often ingenious, methods of measuring a state’s power.
Measuring power, after all, is more than just an exciting idea for those in
academia. Measuring power is essential for politicians, strategists, and
those who engage in international politics. To measure power accurately is
also to have insight into how and why states decide to initiate war.
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This literature review analyzes influential works regarding the power
transition theory and how various researchers measure power. The
literature review covers four critical components: a review of the power
transition theory, hierarchy, status quo, and power measurement.
Reviewing these components of theory contribute to determining the
probability of two states engaging in war using relative military power.
Power Transition Theory–A Basic Review
Organski’s theory on power transition emerged from a dissatisfaction with
the balance of power theory being the dominant theory of international
relations. Organski did not believe the balance of power theory provided an
accurate model of the world that explains how states interact.3 According to
the balance of power theory, states seek to maximize their power, but some
powerful states may serve as a balance to ensure that an alliance or a single
state does not become too powerful and consequently disrupt the balance of
power within the international order.4 According to the father of the power
transition theory, the balance of power theory did not accurately represent
how states interacted within the international system.
Organski critiques the balance of power theory through a historical analysis
and arrives at two conclusions. First, a balance of power amongst states
does not yield peace whenever powerful states abstain from siding with a
particular state during disputes.5 Second, a preponderance of power yields
peace whenever a powerful state, the “balancer,” participates in disputes
and chooses to side with other states.6 Organski’s insight into the fallacies of
the balance of power led to the development of a new theory, the power
transition theory, that focuses on power preponderance leading to peace.
Unlike other theories that attempt to create models explaining the
interaction of all states, the power transition theory created by Organski in
1958 was, at the time, narrow in scope. Instead of attempting to explain the
interactions of states across history, the power transition theory narrowed
its scope by attempting to explain the interactions of states within the
“period of the industrial revolution.”7 However, at least one researcher,
Woosang Kim, tested the premise of this theory and noted that the power
transition theory can explain state interaction in pre-industrial parts of
history.8 By widening the scope to include states from other parts of history,
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Kim’s research indicated that the power transition theory may provide a
better understanding of the interactions of states across all time.9
Notably, the power transition theory identifies the potential for war
whenever two rivaling states achieve parity. When two rivaling states
achieve parity, an opportunity for a power transition becomes possible
where a rising dissatisfied state becomes more powerful than the declining
dominant state. Thus, war is more likely to occur whenever two states
achieve parity. Conversely, peace is more likely to occur than war whenever
a dominant satisfied state maintains a preponderance of power.
Some aspects of the power transition remain the same as they did in 1958,
while other aspects significantly changed over time. Regardless of the
changes, the contributions of Organski and other researchers strengthen
and develop the power transition theory’s understanding of state
interaction. Additional research and critique may improve the power
transition theory’s ability to not only explain state interaction, but also
determine the likelihood of war between two states.
Expanding the Hierarchy
A fundamental premise of the power transition theory is that the world is
not anarchic. Thus, the power transition theory breaks away from one of the
most basic premises of realism and liberalism (and diverges further from
the balance of power theory). Instead of an anarchic world, Organski creates
a model of the world that is hierarchical. In a hierarchical model of the
world, the dominant state is the one “that controls the existing dominant
international order” on top of a power pyramid.10 Below the dominant state
include great powers, middle powers, and small powers. Within the power
pyramid, states are either satisfied or dissatisfied with the international
system. However, the status quo is always to the satisfaction of the
dominant state. Initially, the power transition theory’s model of the world
only described states vying for power at the top of the power pyramid.
Additional research now includes states not necessarily competing for world
hegemony.
One of the earliest published articles arguing for expanding the power
transition theory to include smaller powers occurred in 1976. That year,
Erich Weede published an influential article demonstrating a
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preponderance of power that led to peace amongst forty-one observed Asian
dyads (these dyads include small and middle powers) from 1950 through
1969.11 Weede’s research revealed that the power transition theory explains
more than just the interactions of the most dominant states; it also explains
the interactions of smaller states not vying for hegemony. Since the
publication of Weede’s article in 1976, several other scholars found that the
power transition theory is a valuable model to demonstrate that the
interactions of smaller states are similar to powerful states.12
Douglas Lemke contributes significantly to improving the hierarchical
model concept within his chapter in Parity and War. Lemke claims that
there are multiple hierarchies within the international system and proposes
a multiple-hierarchical model.13 In the multiple-hierarchical model, each
hierarchy nests within a larger hierarchy. States within smaller hierarchies
act similarly to the most powerful states operating at the top of the
hierarchy.14 However, smaller hierarchies cannot typically extend their
power beyond their immediate region.15 For example, Belgium may involve
itself in the affairs of Sweden, but it may not necessarily meddle in the
affairs of Dubai. However, how Belgium interacts with Sweden is similar to
how the United States may interact with China. In other words, “power
distributions and war follow the same pattern regardless of the size of a
country.”16 Although Lemke’s analysis for his multiple-hierarchical model
limits itself to just South America, additional evidence from other
researchers suggests that the power transition theory can describe the
interactions of smaller states with regional hierarchies because they are
similar to states at the top of the hierarchy. Dominant regional powers
cannot influence the larger global hierarchy, but dominant global powers
may interact in the affairs of regional powers.17
Despite the growing popularity of the multiple-hierarchical model, one
researcher found evidence that suggests it is possible to improve Lemke’s
multiple-hierarchical model to include all states within the international
system that are dissatisfied with the status quo but not vying for regional
hegemony.18 Another enterprising researcher considers the multiplehierarchical model as an arbitrary system that is part of the dyadic effect of
the power transition theory.19 The dyadic effect is a method of modeling the
international system by using the power transition theory to explain the
interactions of any set of dyads who experience a power transition.20 While
this concept is exciting and significantly expands the power transition
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theory to explain the interactions of all states, more research is required to
make the dyadic effect part of the power transition theory.
Understanding the hierarchical system helps to identify which dyads to
observe when testing the power transition theory with a new measure of
power. Examining states that experience war due to parity within their
specific hierarchy should yield similar results to all states who engage in war
due to parity regardless of where they exist within the international
hierarchy. Comparing both middle powers and great powers likely yields
evidence that supports Lemke’s multiple-hierarchical model of the power
transition theory and the idea that all states behave similarly within the
international system.
Understanding the Status Quo
Peace occurs whenever a preponderance of power exists amongst the states
that are satisfied with the status quo.21 However, as dissatisfied states grow
in power, they may eventually acquire a preponderance of power sufficient
to challenge the dominant state and the status quo of the international
order.22 However, power transition theory typically observes rivaling states
as dyads. Therefore, only states who achieve parity with a dominant state
within the hierarchical system may challenge the status quo. Organski
argues the conditions for war include the following:
[T]he challenger is of such a size that at its peak it will roughly equal
the dominant nation in power; if the rise of the challenger is rapid; if
the dominant nation is inflexible in its policies; if there is no
tradition of friendship between the dominant nation and the
challenger; and if the challenger sets out to replace the existing
international order with a competitive order of its own.23
Understanding that the world is peaceful only when one dominant state
maintains a preponderance of power reveals the need to measure power and
to measure it accurately. To mismeasure power is also to misunderstand the
relations of states.
Dissatisfaction with the status quo does not always mean that two states will
go to war. The opportunity for a dissatisfied power to challenge a dominant
state occurs when the two states achieve parity. According to Organski and
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Kugler, parity occurs when one state’s power is eighty percent or more of
another state’s power.24 Similarly, two states may achieve parity if they are
within twenty percent of perfect parity. Perfect parity occurs when two
rivaling states (or a dyad pair) achieve equal power relative to one another.
Parity remains a critical aspect of the power transition theory because it
indicates the likelihood of conflict between two states if they are dissatisfied
with the status quo. Huowleing and Siccama build upon this concept
through their observations of rates of change during power transitions. The
two researchers found that “differential growth rates and specifically power
transitions among great powers are indeed a potent predictor of consecutive
outbreaks of war.”25 The rate of change in growth amongst two rivaling
states is a critical aspect of the power transition theory because it can
influence the status quo of states and the probability of war.
As previously mentioned, the probably of war increases whenever states
achieve parity with one another. Therefore, the rate of growth of a rising
state may also influence the probability of war.26 Thus, the rate of change of
difference in power and economic growth rate may also indicate the
probability of war between a dyad pair.27 In other words, the faster the rate
of growth, the probability of war increases; the slower the rate of growth,
the probability of war decreases. Observations into the relative rate of
growth between two states may indicate whether a state is satisfied or
dissatisfied with the status quo.
By observing arms buildups and war, it is possible to also determine
whether a state is satisfied or dissatisfied with the status quo. According to
Werner and Kugler, it is possible to assume that a challenger of the status
quo may increase its growth rate of military expenditures to exceed the
military effort of the dominant state.28 In such an instance, an opportunity
to challenge the status quo occurs when three conditions are satisfied: A
rival state achieves parity with the dominant state, a willingness to
challenge the dominant order refers to a military buildup, and, finally, a
commitment to challenge the dominant order.29 If all three conditions to
challenge the status quo are met, the probability of war increases if the
following conditions are also met: Parity within a dyad, a military buildup,
and the “average growth rate of military expenditures by the challenging
nation exceed[s] that of the dominant nation.”30 Werner and Kugler’s
insight into arms buildup and war indicates that it is possible to examine
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the military power of states over time to determine if they are at a higher
probability of going to war.
However, examining only military power is not sufficient to understand the
status quo. Rivalry is also an essential part of understanding the status quo
of states.31 Frequent disputes stemming from a shared border or conflicting
interests are just a few of the factors that contribute to rivalry amongst
states.32 However, rivalry alone does not explain why a state may initiate
war. For instance, Japan initiated war with the United States despite the
two states not sharing a common land border. Rivalry is just one of many
variables used to determine the probability of war between two countries.
Although rivalry and parity contribute to a state’s satisfaction with the
status quo, the amount of information a state maintains on its competitors
may also influence a state’s satisfaction within the international system.
Reed suggests that the distribution of information is an equally important
aspect of power-centric theories because information may determine
whether a state overestimates or underestimates its rival.33 A common
source of information for state rivalry is each other’s military because it
indicates a state’s capability, resources, and technology.34 Over or
underestimating a rival’s capabilities may determine how a state interprets
its relative power compared to its adversary. In other words,
misunderstandings about relative power due to insufficient information
may influence whether a state decides to go to war if they falsely believe
they have achieved power parity or not.
Empirically determining whether a state is satisfied or dissatisfied with the
status quo eludes researchers. However, additional research into the status
quo to examine two competing state’s relative military power may indicate
their degree of dissatisfaction and their opportunity to challenge the status
quo. The probability of two rivaling states moving towards war increases as
they achieve relative military power parity. Furthermore, because a state
can never know for sure the power of its adversary, it is reasonable to
assume that a state may interpret its adversary’s power capability by its
military personnel and military expenditure.
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Power Measurement–Different Methods
Measuring the power of different states is not an easy task. There are
numerous factors, both quantitative and qualitative, to determine power.
However, some factors are more reliable than others, while other factors are
too complex. Organski initially speculated on potential determinants that
may help researchers measure power. First, he defined power as the ability
to influence others.35 Initially, the most critical determinants of power
included: Population size, political structure, economic development,
national morale, resources, and geography.36 However, those determinants
of power have not held up well to research. For example, it is exceedingly
challenging to operationalize national morale. As the power transition
theory evolved, so too did the determinants of power.
Some determinants of power include external factors, such as alliances,
while others focus more on internal factors, such as military capability. The
debate on whether allies strengthen a state’s capabilities and, thus, a state’s
power continues to this day. Kugler and Lemke suggest that allies may
improve the outcome of war but do not influence the probability of war nor
influence a state’s power capability.37 Despite Kugler and Lemke’s research,
Kim believes that “external means such as alliance formation” does
augment a state’s power.38 Although the literature indicates a healthy
debate on the value of external and internal factors contributing to the
measurement of state power, both factors have value.
Military capability, an internal factor to determine power, indicates
promising results towards providing accurate power measurements. When
utilizing military capability to analyze power transitions, one study proposes
that the conditions for war suffice when two rival dyads achieve equal
power.39 This study compliments the status quo literature that suggests
parity is one of the conditions for war. Although this study on power
measurement focused primarily on internal factors, there are other studies
that do incorporate external factors.
One study used both internal and externa factors considered alliances to
determine state capability. Kim’s study used army size, population, and sea
power to analyze war.40 The raw data from these state capabilities
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contributed to the creation of four independent variables that include
external and internal factors (alliance transition, alliance growth rate,
alliance equality, and dissatisfaction) to measure the likelihood of war in the
two centuries before 1815.41 Kim’s measurement of state power also found
support for the power transition theory.
One of the first attempts to test the power transition theory used an internal
factor that focused on the economy and population: Gross National
Product. Although research suggests that GNP supports the power
transition theory, it is not the best measurement of power.42 GNP focuses on
the output produced by a state’s citizens but does not consider any
additional output from other people residing in the state. Additionally,
larger populations may produce a higher GNP, but if not fully
industrialized, the state’s production immediately returns to the subsistence
of its population. Other issues with GNP include exchange rates amongst
states and difficulty controlling for inflation.43 Despite its shortcomings in
the early studies, Organski and Kugler chose to use GNP due to the
reliability of the data.44 Thus, GNP served as an essential benchmark for
measuring power for the power transition theory. However, the
development of more advanced power measurements caused GNP to fade
away as a useful variable to test the power transition theory.
One of the more popular measures of power is the composite index of
national capabilities (CINC), which is a compelling measurement of power
used by many researchers to evaluate the relative power of different states.
Studies using CINC found substantial evidence to support the power
transition theory. Composite index of national capabilities is a robust
measure of power because it examines state capability through three
dimensions: Demography, industry, and military.45 These variables include
the following: Total population and number of people living in large cities
(demographic dimension), energy production and iron and steel production
(industrial dimension), and, finally, military expenditure and the size of its
military personnel (military dimension).46
However, a common critique of CINC is that it is not possible to determine
if a single state is improving or declining, or if the aggregate data is
improving or declining.47 This issue with CINC is due to the relative nature
of the measurement; CINC fluctuates based on the capabilities of all the
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states in the world.48 Nevertheless, CINC remains an influential
measurement of power used by many political scientists.
Although CINC is not perfect, researchers continue to improve the power
measurement to account for some of the common critiques. The geometric
indicator of national capabilities , a variation of CINC, accounts for
fluctuations that derive from the growth of other states and can allow
political scientists to minimize the number of “artificial, masked, magnified,
minimized, and mistimed transitions” that occur due to CINC.49 Heckman
modified CINC by multiplying “likely external sources of power” and the
traditional CINC representing internal sources of power to determine the
overall power of a state that accounts for all sources of power.50 The “likely
external sources of power” refer to the S-score developed by Signorino and
Ritter in 1999 that indicates alliances and similarities between states’
policies.51 The modified CINC score provides a new method to evaluate
power capability by combining a well-established measurement of power
with a less-utilized measurement of alliances. Additional research utilizing
well-established and less common power measurements may lead to the
discovery of new measures of power to understand the interactions of
states.
The most promising measurement of power is the SDP developed by
Anders, Fariss, and Markowitz in 2020. The SDP “estimates the upper
bound on the resources a state can sustainably extract” after accounting for
the needs of its population.52 The inventors of SDP compiled enough data to
cover a period that ranges from 1800 to 2018. Utilizing their data, the
researchers found that some states are not nearly as powerful as other
measures of power indicate.53 SDP is promising because it focuses on the
surplus capabilities of a state by accounting for the needs of its population.
Just because a state is large does not mean that it is also powerful. Research
analyzing military capabilities combined with SDP may yield valuable
discoveries that reveal new aspects of measuring power.

Hypothesis
The literature review highlights three critical components of the power
transition theory. First, the rate of change of growth is critical in
determining whether a dyad may or may not go to war. Second, the
hierarchical model of the power transition theory extends to all states, not

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol14/iss3/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.14.3.1884

95

Koch: Power Transition Theory

just the great powers. Third, SDP and military capability are potential
measures of state power that, when combined, could provide an accurate
representation of relative power amongst states.
The author hypothesizes that two rivaling states (one dissatisfied with the
status quo and the other satisfied with the status quo) who achieve relative
military power parity are more likely to go to war unless the two states
escape their relative military power parity. This hypothesis assumes that
wars are more likely to occur when rivaling states achieve parity. The
hypothesis combines two of the three critical components of the power
transition theory to test. The hypothesis does not incorporate rates of
change over time.
The hypothesis is unique because it introduces and analyzes relative
military power. Relative military power is the power of a state compared to
a rival. However, any attempt to measure power exclusively through the
lens of the military fails to account for all aspects of state power. Therefore,
it is necessary to combine a state’s economic, demographic, and military
power to account for almost all aspects of state power. Thus, the author uses
SDP because it represents the economic potential and demography of a
state by considering the resources required to sustain its population. To
account for military power, the author tests whether using military
expenditure and military personnel or just one of the two variables is a
better determinant of relative military power.
Methodology
This article measures power by combining SDP with one of two variables
from the COW Project to create an equation that measures relative military
power. The hypothesis assumes that state interactions include multiple
hierarchies. This assumption increases the potential sampling populations
to test the power transition theory. However, this study only uses a total of
three sample populations (𝑛 = 3).
The variables from the Correlates of War Project used to determine relative
military power include military expenditure and military personnel.54 The
author compares military expenditure and military personnel to one
another to determine if one variable is more useful than the other. The
following equation measures discrete relative military power utilizing one
military capability variable:
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𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑡 =

𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑅𝑗𝑡
+
(𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 ) (𝑀𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 )

This equation expands on Anderson, Fariss, and Markowitz’s equation on
relative SDP by introducing military capability.55 This equation incorporates
relative military expenditure alongside relative power resources from SDP.
However, it is possible to substitute the military capability variable, military
personnel ratio, 𝑀𝑃𝑅, with military expenditure ratio, 𝑀𝑅. It is necessary to
test the military expenditure and military personnel ratios separately to
analyze the similarities and differences between them. It is important to
note that this equation is discrete; it only reveals relative military power
between two states within one year. Plotting the values of 𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑡 over time can
reveal fluctuations in relative military power and the likelihood of two states
being engaged in war. A mixed-methods analysis may reveal differences
between the two variables and whether one variable is more valuable than
the other.
Although measuring one military capability variable at a time between
rivaling powers may prove helpful to analyze differences within the
variables, combining the variables may also yield interesting results.
Aggregating the two military capability variables may provide better insight
into overall relative military power because it accounts for military
expenditure, military personnel, and SDP. The following equation
represents discrete relative military power utilizing both military capability
variables:
𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 =

𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝑀𝑃𝑅𝑗𝑡
+
(𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 ) (𝑀𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝑀𝑃𝑅𝑗𝑡 ) + (𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 )

This equation is likely more useful than the previous discrete equation
because it incorporates military personnel and military expenditure.
However, more is not always better. It is necessary to analyze the findings to
determine which one proves more useful to determine relative military
power. One may reasonably expect that this equation does provide a more
accurate representation of relative military power because it includes both
variables of military capability
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Next, it is necessary to operationalize military power parity. Understanding
that perfect parity possesses a value of one and that parity exists within
twenty percent of a rival, it is possible to determine relative military power
parity. If 𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑡 or 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 equals a relative military power value between 0.8 and
1.2, it is reasonable to assume that the observed state possesses relative
military power parity with its competitor. This operationalized definition of
relative military power parity comes from understanding that parity occurs
when a state is within twenty percent of another state’s power.56
Based on the discrete relative military power equation, if two states are
perfectly equal, the observed country will have a relative military power
value of one. A value of one thus indicates perfect parity between two
rivaling states. The following proof represents perfect parity:
𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑡 =

𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑅𝑗𝑡
+
(𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 ) (𝑀𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 )

Using two fictional states, state A and state B, it is possible to find the
relative military power of state A with its competitor, state B. In this model,
the two states have an equal SDP (value of two) and an equal military
expenditure ratio (value of six).
2
6
+
(2 + 2) (6 + 6)
2 6
𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑡 = +
4 12
𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 1

𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑡 =

This proof demonstrates that perfect parity equals a value of one. However,
it is important to keep in mind that parity lays between a relative military
power value of 0.8 and 1.2. This range in parity exists due to the upper and
lower bounds having a value of zero and two, respectively. Furthermore, it is
possible to know that the parity range is 0.4 because it is twenty percent of
the upper bound. If perfect parity possesses a value of one, parity ranges
from a relative military power value of 0.8 to 1.2. Therefore, a state does not
obtain parity with a competitor until it falls into the relative military power
range of 0.8 to 1.2.
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If 𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑡 , or 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 , equals a relative military power value between 0.0 to .79, the
observed state is relatively stronger in military power or capability than its
competitor. Therefore, the opposite must hold (the observed state is weaker
than its competitor) if the value is greater than 1.2. Figure 1 provides a
visual representation of parity to help understand this concept:
Figure 1. Relative Power and Parity Chart

Source: Author.
Figure 1 graphically depicts how relative military power correlates to a state
being stronger, weaker, or equal to a competitor. that the closer two states
move towards an equal relative military power, the more perfect the parity
(represented by the relative military power value of 1), the more likely war is
to occur between a dyad pair. Lastly, Figure 1 depicts those stronger states
have lower relative military power values compared to weaker states.
Research Design
The author tests their hypothesis using a limited population size (𝑛 = 3).
The experiment will utilize three dyad pairs: United States and Japan,
United States and Russia, and Iraq and Iran. The United States and Japan
represents a great power dyad pair who went to war. United States and
Russia represents a great power dyad pair who never formally went to war.
Iraq and Iran represents a regional power dyad pair who went to war.
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Furthermore, the dyad pairs come from both great powers and middle
powers vying for hegemony.
The author uses the relative military power equations to determine the
likelihood of war between sample dyads. The author expects the United
States and Japan dyad to reach military power parity shortly before 1941
when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The author also suspects the United
States and Russia dyad to achieve relative military power parity shortly
between 1945 and 1947. The Cold War between these two states begins to
take shape during these years when most of Eastern Europe becomes soviet
satellite states, and George Kennan pens his famous Long Telegram that
influences the foreign policy of the United States. The author also expects
Iraq and Iran to achieve relative military power parity in 1978, the year of
the Iranian Revolution. The author expects Iraq’s relative military power to
improve and, thus, create an opportunity to challenge Iran’s regional
hegemony in 1980.
Using the equations for relative military power, the author analyzes each of
the dyads to test the power transition theory. Based on the original
hypothesis, the author expects the probability of war to increase whenever a
dyad pair achieves relative military power parity. However, because the
author is developing a measure of relative military power, they will also
compare which data set (military expenditure and SDP, military personnel
and SDP, or military personnel, military expenditure, and SDP) best aligns
with known wars amongst rivaling states from history and brief case
studies. Thus, this article intends to use a mixed-methods analysis approach
to test the power transition theory.

Findings
The data from the experiment provide promising support to the power
transition theory. Each dyad observed supports the power transition
theory’s claim that peace occurs whenever a state maintains a
preponderance of power. Conversely, the data indicates a higher probability
of war when a dyad pair achieves relative military power. The best data set
to support the power transition theory and aligned with historical events
incorporated SDP and military expenditure.
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Military Expenditure Performs Better with SDP
Figure 2. United States and Japan Dyad’s Relative Military Power Using
MILEX and SDP

Source: Author.
The first dyad pair analyzed is the United States and Japan from 1920 to
1945. This range in time provided the author with plenty of data points to
test the hypothesis. According to Figure 2, the United States was militarily
more powerful than Japan until 1937; therefore, the probability of war was
relatively low. However, Figure 2 indicates that Japan and the United States
achieved relative military power parity from 1937 until 1941. Figure 2
indicates that Japan possessed greater relative military power from 1938 to
1940 than the United States. The data indicates that Japan also possessed
the capability and opportunity to challenge the status quo as a rising
dissatisfied state. Japan seized the opportunity by bombing Pearl Harbor in
1941. However, the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 likely accelerated the
United States to utilize more of its state capabilities and resources and
direct them towards the development of its military power capabilities
because this event drew the United States into WWII.
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Although Japan maintained an early advantage possessing greater relative
military power, United States took the lead in 1941 as the dominant military
power. Although the war between Japan and the United States did not end
in 1941, the results from Figure 2 indicate the United States quickly
becoming much more powerful compared to Japan through 1945. These
results indicate that although the probability of war initiation increases
when two states achieve parity, war termination does not immediately occur
when one states achieves greater relative military power over the other.
Although these initial findings are promising, Figure 3 does not provide the
same results.
Figure 3. United States and Japan Dyad’s Relative Military Power Using
MILPER and SDP

Source: Author.
Figure 3 tells an entirely different story about Japan and the United States.
Although the two states achieve relative military power parity, it shows that
Japan is stronger than the United States for nearly two decades. During that
time, Japan was at war with China, whereas the United States withdrew
from the world after WWI and shrunk its military. Therefore, it is not
beyond reason to conclude that this chart aligns with historical events.
Furthermore, when Japan became relatively stronger than the United States
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in 1939, it likely motivated the attack in 1941. The second period of power
parity closely aligns with some of the deadliest battles in the Pacific Theater
during World War II. However, the third period of parity appears random.
The United States defeated Japan in 1945, but this figure indicates that the
two states achieve relative military power parity during that time. Although
certain aspects of this figure appear convincing, it does not align with
historical events, nor does it accurately capture war initiation and
termination when analyzing parity.
The first dyad pair analyzed indicates that military expenditure performs
better than military personnel when combined with SDP. However, how
well does military expenditure and SDP perform compared to the other two
dyad pairs, United States and Russia and Iraq and Iran? Figures 4 and 5
represent the United States and Russia dyad pair and reveal more
differences between military expenditure and military personnel. These two
figures extend from 1925 to 2010 to provide enough data points to
understand the relationship between these two states.
Figure 4. United States and Russia Dyad’s Relative Military Power Using
MILEX and SDP

Source: Author.
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Figure 4 depicts some of the more dangerous moments of the Cold War as
the two states moved towards perfect parity. In 1962, both states achieved
nearly perfect parity. Coincidentally, this is also when the Cuban Missile
Crisis occurred, arguably one of the most dangerous moments of the Cold
War when Russia deployed missiles just miles away from the United States.
These two figures tell different stories about the Cold War. First, when
evaluating both Russia and the United States’ relative military power
capability using only military expenditure, the two states briefly achieved
relative military parity in 1941 before the United States quickly became the
more powerful state. The two states re-achieve relative military parity in
1947. Although numerous factors influence why the two states achieve
relative military power parity during this time, the most logical connection
stems from George Kennan’s Long Telegram sent to Secretary Brynes in
1946. In this telegram, Kennan claims that Russia cannot maintain a
peaceful coexistence with capitalism and that the United States’ hegemony,
society, and way of life may irrevocably change if Russia’s power becomes
secure.57 The next year, in 1947, Russia and the United States achieved
relative military power parity and the two states quickly became locked into
a cold war that lasted for over forty years.
Furthermore, Russia became stronger than the United States based upon
their relative military power in 1970. Although the two states still existed in
relative military power parity, Russia remained the stronger of the two
states. This long period of relative military power parity ended in 1989 with
the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the dissolution of the
USSR. The parity resumed the next year and lasted until 1991, when the
USSR formally dissolved. From 1991 to 2010, the United States and Russia
never achieved parity again, with the United States remaining the dominant
state.
Figure 4 also appears to support Organski and Kugler’s conclusion that
nuclear weapons do not change how powers interact with one another.58
Other power transition theorists found that the likelihood of war is lower
when two nuclear-armed rivals achieve parity compared to similar
situations involving rivals with only conventional weapons.59 Furthermore,
peace is more likely to occur when one state maintains a preponderance of
nuclear power over another.60 Figure 4 supports these claims and indicates
that the United States was much stronger than Russia after 1991.
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Figure 5. United States and Russia Dyad’s Relative Military Power Using
MILPER and SDP

Source: Author.
Figure 5 reveals a different story about the United States and Russia dyad
pair. It reveals that the United States and Russia maintained parity from
1940 to 2010, except in 1950 when the dyad pair did not achieve parity.
Furthermore, Figure 5 depicts the USSR as the stronger of the two states
during the majority of the Cold War until 1992. It is not until after the
dissolution of the USSR that the United States becomes more powerful, but
still within parity, in 1992. This chart does not represent a common
understanding of the Cold War between the two states. Although one may
argue that the two states did achieve parity during World War II, it is
difficult to argue that Russia and the United States remained close
competitors in terms of relative military power after the dissolution of the
USSR. However, Figure 5 and Figure 4 represent similarities displaying
nearly perfect parity in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis. This evidence
suggests that military expenditure combined with SDP better explains the
Cold War than military personnel and SDP.
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Figure 5 does not provide the indicate the same level of support to the
power transition theory as Figure 4. After 1991, the United States
maintained a relatively long period of peace throughout the world as the
dominant state. The United States undoubtedly possessed a nuclear
preponderance that contributed to this period of relative peace after 1991.
However, Figure 5 observed that Russia and the United States still
maintained relative military parity after 1991. Knowing that the relations
between the two states significantly changed after 1991, it is difficult to
defend military personnel and SDP as a viable measure of relative military
power to test the power transition theory.
Although the United States and Russia maintained long periods of military
power parity for most of the Cold War, the two states never engaged in
direct war. One may conclude that it was neither in the United States’ or
Russia’s interest to go to war due to a lack of political willpower to commit
to war or the fear of upending their economy for war. In either case, other
variables not observed contributed to restraining the two states from going
to war. Additional research to explore why two rivaling states achieve
relative military power parity but do not go to war appears necessary.
Figure 6. Iraq and Iran’s Relative Military Power Using MILEX and SDP

Source: Author.
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Figure 7. Iraq and Iran’s Relative Military Power Using MILPER and SDP

Source: Author.
Figures 6 and 7 represent the relative military power of Iraq and Iran using
military expenditure and military personnel. As previously mentioned, this
dyad pair is important to analyze because the power transition theory
applies to all powers, regardless of size, who compete over regional or area
domination. Similar to the previous dyad pairs analyzed, Iraq and Iran’s
military expenditure appears to represent the two rivaling powers moving
towards war better than military personnel and SDP.
However, both figures depict Iraq and Iran achieving relative military power
parity during the Iranian Revolution (1978 to 1979). This similarity
indicates that both variables do well to represent a correlation between
relative military power parity and war initiation for this observed dyad
power. However, where the two variables diverge is at the end of the IraqIran War in 1988. The nearly eight-year war ended in a stalemate, and both
figures depict the two states maintaining relative military power parity after
1988. However, with the destruction of the Iraqi military by the United
States-led coalition in 1991, the two figures diverge. The first figure depicts
Iran becoming more powerful shortly after the Gulf War. Figure 7 does not
depict Iran becoming more powerful than Iraq; instead, it maintains close
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parity with Iraq. This difference indicates that military expenditure is a
better indicator of depicting war initiation and war resolution.
Combining Military Expenditure, Military Personnel, and SDP
From the mixed-methods analysis of this limited data, enough evidence
appears to support military expenditure performing better supporting the
power transition theory and aligning with historical events than military
personnel. However, it is also necessary to identify how both variables
perform when combined with SDP. After computing the data and
combining the three variables, it became evident that the combined data
shared strong similarities with military expenditure and SDP. The author
chose to analyze military expenditure combined with SDP and military
expenditure and military personnel combined with SDP to determine if it is
possible to reject the null hypothesis (no statistical difference exists
amongst the two data sets). The author conducted a t-test using data
sampling from one state within each of the three dyad pairs. The author
chose to use only state because the relativity of the data between the
observed state and competitor yields similar results.
The author chose to use the data for the relative military power of Iraq,
Russia, and Japan to conduct the t-test. The results indicate that it is not
possible to reject the null hypothesis. Each t-test conducted yielded a pvalue greater than ninety-nine percent. The mean and the variance for the
three data sets are nearly identical as well. Therefore, graphing the data set
that used military expenditure, military capability, and SDP appears
identical to the figure using the data set for only military expenditure and
SDP. Furthermore, this indicates that the mixed-methods analysis used to
explain state interaction with the military expenditure and SDP dataset can
apply to the military expenditure, military personnel, and SDP dataset.

Conclusion
The results from testing the hypothesis prove promising. The mixedmethods approach to analyze the data suggests that relative military power
supports the power transition theory. When analyzing the three dyad pairs
from this article, military expenditure combined with SDP adequately
indicated that likelihood of war increased as rivaling states achieved relative
military power parity. However, military personnel combined with SDP did
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not perform nearly as well. Russia could not compete with the United States
in the mid-1990s after the dissolution of the USSR, but military personnel
combined with SDP indicates that the two states maintained relative
military power parity through 2010. It seems reasonable to reject military
personnel as a sole variable when analyzing relative military power.
Furthermore, the lack of any statistical difference between combining
military personnel with military expenditure and SDP compared to military
expenditure and SDP indicates that military personnel does not
significantly contribute to determining the relative military power of dyads.
Future research to improve upon the author’s hypothesis may include the
following equation to analyze the relative military power of dyads:
𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑡 =

𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑅𝑗𝑡
+
(𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 ) (𝑀𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 )

This equation combines military expenditure and SDP. Although there is no
statistical difference when combining military personnel with military
expenditure and SDP compared to just military expenditure and SDP, it is
unnecessary to include a variable that does not provide any statistical
difference when aggregated. Therefore, the author suggests using only
military expenditure and SDP to evaluate relative military power. However,
additional research into other case studies may find that combining military
personnel with military expenditure and SDP may yield better results
compared to using only military expenditure and SDP.
Overall, these results are promising. However, this article does contain
flaws that can improve with further research. One major issue with the
design of the experiment is the lack of a control variable. However, no
measurement currently exists that focuses exclusively on measuring relative
military power amongst dyads. The lack of a control variable required a
mix-methods approach for this article.
One critical population missing from this test is a power transition between
a dyad pair who is satisfied with the status quo. Testing a peaceful power
transition may provide additional support to using relative military power
as a useful test of the power transition theory. Furthermore, this article
examined only discrete changes of power of time. Incorporating rates of
change over time can improve how researchers analyze how quickly an
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observed power improves or diminishes its military power relative to a
competitor. Lastly, additional research into rival powers’ economic and
political interests may yield additional insight into whether two rivaling
states go to war even if they achieved relative military power parity.
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